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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court considered a constitutional
challenge to a Washington statute that criminalized acts of deliberate assistance of
another in committing suicide.1 The Court ruled that an asserted right to physician
assisted suicide was not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, concluded the influential decision with a strong statement: “the opinion
should not restrict the continuation of the open debate in our society about all aspects
of physician assisted suicide.”3
The issue of how to care for the terminally ill patient, whether by use of palliative
care techniques, a medical treatment process placing the relief of pain as the primary
care goal, or by allowing the patient to voluntarily end their life, has been enriched
by the far-reaching implications of the court’s decision.4 Timothy Quill, M.D.,
published an influential article in the New England Journal of Medicine which
frames the issue of physician assisted suicide.5 Dr. Quill wrote about his patient
Diane who had recovered from several difficult life circumstances only to discover
that she had acute myelomonocytic leukemia.6 Dr. Quill described the woman as an
1

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).

2

Id. at 702.

3

Id. at 735.

4

Joan Felice Raymond, Life and Death Choices, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER SUNDAY
MAGAZINE, October 16, 1999, at 9.
5

Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity, A Case of Individualized Decision Making, NEW
ENG. J. MED., Mar. 7, 1991, at 691.
6
Id. at 692 (Myelomonocytic leukemia is an acute or chronic disease involving the spleen
or bone marrow characterized by an abnormal increase in the number of leukocytes in the
tissue of the body.).
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“incredibly clear, at times brutally honest thinker and communicator” who had
finally taken complete control of her life with a strong sense of independence and
self-esteem.7 Faced with the prospect of a fifty percent survival rate involving
extensive chemotherapy treatments and other considerably intrusive and complicated
medical care, Diane, with the support of her family, decided not to undergo the
recommended therapy.8 Dr. Quill stated that she wanted to live her remaining time
with her family outside of the hospital.9
After considerable discussions between Dr. Quill and Diane about her care,
Diane expressed the importance of the need and value of maintaining control of
herself and her dignity over the upcoming months.10 Dr. Quill wrote “that Diane
expressed that when the time came, she wanted to take her life in the least painful
way possible.”11 A short time later, Dr. Quill prescribed barbiturates after carefully
considering the brief conversation between the two about Diane’s trouble sleeping.12
Dr. Quill noted that it was evident to him that Diane then felt secure knowing that if
the time came she would be able to voluntarily end the suffering at her moment of
choice.13 Diane did take the medications and quietly passed away at home with her
family one hour after ingesting the drugs.14 Dr. Quill wrote: “[s]uffering can be
lessened to some extent, but in no way eliminated or made benign, by careful
intervention of a competent, caring physician, given current social constraints.”15
This Note will examine current issues pertaining to the medical care of the
terminally ill individual, particularly with respect to palliative care and how the
continuum of medical care incorporates the voluntary termination of a patient’s life.
Part II of this Note will look at the decision reached in Washington v. Glucksberg
and how the Supreme Court has contributed to the molding of care for the terminally
ill. Part III will review relevant aspects of end of life care concepts and their
relationship and impact upon the assisted suicide alternative. Any analysis of
physician assisted suicide must include the evolution of Oregon’s legislative
approach to the topic.16 Oregon is the only state which provides terminally ill
citizens the option of assisted suicide by legislative initiative, viz., the Death with
Dignity Act.17 The Act will be reviewed at length in Part IV.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id. at 693.

10

Quill, supra note 5, at 694.

11

Id. at 692.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Quill, supra note 5, at 694.

16

OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2000) (The statute is titled The Oregon Death with Dignity
Act, and became law on October 27, 1997.).
17

Id.
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The final portion of this note will take a hard look at how the United States
Congress has addressed the issue of care of the terminally ill with such initiatives as
the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998.18 The 106th Congress is also
considering legislation to promote pain management and palliative care under the
Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999.19 However well intended this legislation is, the
proposed law may drastically impact Oregon’s physician assisted suicide law and
could repress the possible improvements needed in palliative care by physicians.
This Note will conclude with the proposition that physician assisted suicide, not
euthanasia, is merely an option in the continuum of care for the terminally ill patient.
When all practical and available medical procedures fail to provide the terminally ill
patient with comfort and dignity during the final stages of life, the affected patient
has a medical and, arguably, a legal right to end life with dignity.
II: THE SUPREME COURT INFLUENCE UPON HEALTH CARE OF THE TERMINALLY ILL
Physician assisted suicide began to evolve as a constitutional issue when two
different United States Courts struck down state statues prohibiting physician
assisted suicide.20 In Compassion In Dying v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals considered a substantive due process attack on a Washington statute
prohibiting the aiding of another person to commit suicide.21 The Ninth Circuit held
that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
applied to terminally ill patients who wished to end their life by taking medications
prescribed by their physician.22 The appellate court reasoned that a person had a
liberty interest in choosing how and when to die.23
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Compassion In Dying, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals considered a physicians action in Quill v. Vacco.24 This
case challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute, similar to the
Washington law, which also made it a crime to assist someone in committing
suicide.25 The physicians asserted that because New York allowed a competent
person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, which was “essentially similar” to
physician assisted suicide, that similarly-situated persons were treated differently.26
18

The Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998, H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998) (The
bill was introduced to the House of Representatives on June 5, 1998, and was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, which held hearings on July 14, 1998. The bill never reached the
house floor for a vote.).
19

The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999) (The bill was
introduced to the House of Representatives on June 17, 1999 and was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, which held hearings on June 24, 1999. The bill passed the House
by a margin of 271 to 156.).
20

Compassion In Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).

21

Id. at 838.

22

Id. at 793.

23

Id. at 816.

24

80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).

25

Id.

26

Id. at 718.
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In reversing a district court decision, the court of appeals held that the New York
statute did not treat competent persons equally in the final stages of life, and
therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause.27
The Supreme Court consolidated and reviewed the Ninth Circuit decision in
Compassion In Dying v. Washington and the Second Circuit decision in Quill.28 The
issue before the Supreme Court in Glucksberg involved the existence of a liberty
interest in selecting the manner and time in which an individual may die.29 In Quill,
the Court considered whether the New York law prohibiting physician assisted
suicide was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.30 Thus, the constitutional
review focused upon the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to an individual’s
right to voluntarily terminate life with the assistance of a physician.31
In Glucksberg, the action was brought by three terminally ill plaintiffs, four
physicians and the non-profit Washington organization, Compassion In Dying.32
The three terminally ill patients had died before the Court’s decision, which
illustrates the important nature of the right to die at a time selected by the
individual.33 Compassion In Dying is a non-profit organization that counsels people
considering physician assisted suicide and is a strong supporter of an individual’s
right to die in Washington.34
The respondents asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
extended a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to consent
to and to commit suicide with the assistance of a physician.35 The Court provided
two lines of reasoning in ruling that no such liberty interest was protected by the
Constitution. First, the Court concluded that the liberty interest to end life
voluntarily was not a fundamental right which was so deeply rooted in the nation’s
history and tradition deserving of protection under the Due Process Clause.36 The
Court analyzed the physician assisted suicide issue based upon whether the right to
end life was so rooted in the traditions and consciousness of the people that the right
was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.37 The Court determined that the
nation’s legal history of prohibiting suicide, coupled with the fact that many states
had enacted statutes making it a crime to help someone kill himself or herself was
sufficient to find the issue of physician assisted suicide lacking the muster to grant
27

Id. at 731.

28

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702.

29

Simon M. Canick, Constitutional Aspects of Physican-Assisted Suicide After Lee v.
Oregon, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 69 (1997).
30

Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 798 (1997).

31

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 708.

35

Id. at 723.

36

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.

37

Id.

2000-01]
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Constitutional protection.38 Secondly, the Court found that Washington’s ban on
physician assisted suicide was rationally related to a legitimate state government
interest.39 Even though the Court’s decision was unanimous in both cases, careful
examination of the written opinions of the Court and their suggests that the Court
was supportive of the right to die. The Court was not about to overturn centuries of
legal rulings and establish a fundamental right to end life without greater
justification. The rulings arguably may indicate judicial support for the voluntary
termination of life under the direction of a physician in more appropriate
circumstances.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg
provides many indications of the Court’s concern and understanding for the
terminally ill patient’s choice to end his or her life. The Court recognized that
because of the advances made in medicine, Americans were more likely to die in
institutions from chronic illnesses.40 The Court acknowledged that the public was
very concerned about the issue of protecting an individual’s dignity and
independence in the final stages of life.41 One may consider whether this is a signal
by the Court that death with dignity may eventually evolve into a constitutionally
protected right.42 In another context, the Court did not consider the right to refuse
medical treatment as a constitutionally protected right after review of only one case;
on the contrary, the recognition of the right was an evolutionary process which took
many circumstances and legal determinations to culminate in the protection outlined
by the Court in Cruzan v. Missouri.43 In Cruzan, the Court held a competent person
had a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause to refuse unwanted medical
treatment.44
The Court in Glucksberg took notice that many states were “currently engaged in
serious, thoughtful examinations for physician assisted suicide and other similar
issues.”45 The Court was concerned about the potential dangers a protection of a
right to physician assisted suicide might create; such a sudden change in public
policy would outweigh any benefit achieved.46 The legalization of assisted suicide
could create considerable risks of social harm to individuals who are ill and
vulnerable to the influence of third parties.47 These individuals could be at risk of
coercion, or they might make the decision to end their lives because of pressure from
a third party. One could argue that if the potential dangers of physician assisted
38

Id. at 728.

39

Id.

40

Id. at 716.

41

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716.

42

David A. Pratt, Too Many Physicians: Physician
Glucksberg/Quill, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 161, 221 (1999).
43

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 302 (1990).

44

Id.

45

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719.

46

Id.

47

Id.

Assisted

Suicide

After
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suicide failed to materialize, the public policy argument of social harm becomes less
influential under the Court’s analysis. The Court’s public policy position could also
weaken by a shift in the public demand for increased improvements in the care of the
terminally ill. Therefore, the public policy argument may prove less of a legal
ground to support a constitutional rejection of the voluntary right to terminate life.
Of greater significance to the Court may be the prospect that, as medical experts
predict, the population of aging baby boomers will increase its demand for
improvements in how we die.48
The majority in Glucksberg took the position that the Court has historically been
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the “guideposts
for responsible decision making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”49
It would follow that with a progressive expansion of care and improvement in the
methods of care for the terminally ill, combined with a greater precision to diagnose
and treat the symptoms of a terminal illness, one could expect to see that the
guideposts for responsible decision-making beginning to emerge. Such an evolution
will help pave the way for a more comfortable legal base from which to establish
conditions for physician assisted suicide. Oregon’s experience with the Death with
Dignity Act, reviewed later in this Note, may provide a wealth of information to
better determine protective guideposts required by the Court.
The concurring opinions of Justices Souter, O’Connor, Stevens, and Breyer offer
support for the position that the Court’s posture may be subject to a future shift.50 In
each of the concurring opinions the Justices acknowledge the importance of how a
person faces death and that many people will spend his or her last days in pain and
discomfort.51 The concurring opinions also highlight each Justice’s concern for
avoiding severe pain during the final stages of a terminal illness and in the manner in
which the terminally ill patient may be forced to suffer during the last days of life.52
Each Justice recognized the need of the terminally ill patient to die with dignity.53
Arguably, the Supreme Court seems to be concerned that the terminally ill patient
must have available reasonable palliative care for the treatment of severe pain.54
Justice Souter’s opinion acknowledged that providing terminally ill patients, such as
the respondents, with prescribed medication that went beyond the relief of pain and
hastened death would be consistent with medical standards.55 He agreed that the
Washington statute prevented a physician from exercising his best professional
judgment in prescribing medications to terminally ill patients in dosages that would
enable the patients to end their lives.56 Justice Souter accepted that physician
48

Raymond, supra note 4, at 16.

49

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.

50

See generally id. at 736-92.

51

Id. at 716.

52

See generally id. at 736-92.

53

Id.

54

Pratt, supra note 42, at 174.

55

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 753.

56

Id.
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assisted suicide would fall within the accepted tradition of medical care in our
society by relating the physician’s role in abortion cases to that of the role in assisted
suicide: as a role ministering to the needs of the patient.57 Justice Souter wrote:
The patients here sought not only an end to pain (which they might have
had, although perhaps at the price of stupor) but an end to their short
remaining lives with a dignity that they believed would be denied them by
powerful pain medication, as well as by their consciousness of
dependency and helplessness as they approached death.58
Souter concluded that during the period of time when death was imminent, to end
one’s life is generally accepted as a proper exercise of autonomy over one’s body
with a recognized Constitutional protection.59 Justice Souter concurred because of
the substantial nature of the disagreement regarding the facts on assisted suicide and
the alternatives for resolving the dispute.60 One can conclude from Justice Souter’s
position that there are patients suffering from a terminal illness that may have a
constitutionally protected right to end life. However, the patient’s circumstances in
Glucksberg were not persuasive enough for the Court to extend due process
protection.
One of the more striking statements made by Justice Souter, which contributed to
his position against assisted suicide, was his concern that mistaken decisions may
result from inadequate palliative care, or a terminal prognosis that was made in
error.61 Souter stated that the day may come when one side of the assisted suicide
argument will prevail, but his considerable disagreement with the facts and the
choices for solution were sufficient to reject the protection of due process.62 He did
provide a powerful conclusion to his concurrence when he stated that the facts
necessary for resolving the issue were not ascertainable through the judicial process,
but were more likely to be identified through legislative fact-finding and
experimentation at the state and federal level.63
Justice O’Connor also wrote a concurring opinion in Glucksberg whereby she
indicated confidence that the democratic process would identify the necessary
balance between the interests of the terminally ill who wish to end life, and the
interests of those who would be influenced to make the same choice by other
factors.64 She concluded that in such circumstances, the challenge of constructing
the safeguards to the interests of the terminally ill was best left to “the laboratory of
the States.”65 Justice O’Connor considered that the States’ interests in protecting the
57

Id. at 779.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 786.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id. at 737.

65

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737.
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individuals who were not truly competent or terminally ill were sufficiently
important to justify laws against physician assisted suicide.66 Again it is apparent
that some members of the Supreme Court are signaling that the States under their
sovereign right to regulate medical care may address the assisted suicide issue.
Similarly, the Court appears to be sending a message that medical care for the
terminally ill was considered a dominant factor when each Justice reached his or her
respective decision.
Equally supportive to the proponents of the right to end life was Justice Stevens’
position that he would not rule out the possibility that a patient seeking suicide
assistance from a physician could prevail in a more “particularized” challenge.67
Justice Stevens was the most vocally supportive of the voluntary termination of life
issue, and his use of the term “particularized challenge” may suggest that a more
specific set of circumstances will be needed in order to gain constitutional protection
for assisted suicide.68 Stevens joined in the majority’s conclusion that the potential
harm from granting a liberty interest in assisted suicide was sufficient to support the
State’s public policy interest.69 Stevens commented that a State such as Washington,
which authorizes use of the death penalty, has in essence determined that the sanctity
of life does not require preservation in all instances.70 Stevens stated that
Washington must also acknowledge that there will be other situations in which
hastening death is legitimate.71 Justice Stevens was convinced that there are
instances when the interest is entitled to constitutional protection.72 He also stated
that end of life decisions were central to personal dignity and autonomy and such
matters would fall within the protection of the constitution.73 His position focused
upon the avoidance of intolerable pain and the indignity of living one’s final days
incapacitated and in agony.74 Justice Stevens acknowledged conceptually that
patients whose physical pain is inadequately treated will be more likely to request
assisted suicide.75 He suggested that encouragement for the development and
endurance of palliative care would prevent some instances of life-terminating
actions.76 He also indicated that greater use of palliative care would not eliminate all
pain and suffering.77 However, greater use of palliative care would reduce the

66

Id.

67

Id. at 749; see also Pratt, supra note 42, at 174.

68

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 750.

69

Id. at 741.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 742.

72

Id.

73

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 744.

74

Id. at 751.

75

Id. at 747.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 748.
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demand for assisted suicide and under such developments the more “particularized”
challenge may begin to evolve.78
Justice Breyer’s concurrence cited the possibility that the right to die with dignity
may be the legal tradition required for protection under the Due Process Clause.79
Breyer acknowledged that the core right would be personal control over the manner
of how one should die, which included the avoidance of unnecessary and severe
physical suffering.80 Justice Breyer was more direct in his position on the liberty
interest issue by stating that the avoidance of severe physical pain would have to
comprise an essential part of any successful constitutional claim.81 He pointed out,
as did Justice O’Connor, that the laws of Washington and New York did not force a
dying person to undergo severe physical pain.82 Glucksberg appears to have left
open the possible extension of constitutional protection for the voluntary right to end
life.83 How will the Court apply the provisions expounded upon in Glucksberg to a
patient who has undergone appropriate and extensive palliative care while the severe
pain is unrelieved to the point of affecting dignity and personal autonomy? Or, in
the alternative, if a state has not taken reasonable measures to provide reasonably
available palliative care for pain, is the state forcing a patient to die with severe
physical pain and therefore violating his or her right to dignity? The Court may be
suggesting that the medical community and the states will need to more aggressively
and comprehensively address the patients’ need to end life with dignity and absent
less suffering. Some suggest that the five Supreme Court Justices were in effect
saying that palliative care may be a constitutional right.84
III: IS ASSISTED SUICIDE A CONSEQUENCE OF A LACK OF PALLIATIVE CARE OR IS
CHOICE THE DOMINANT FACTOR?
Glucksberg contains some significant implications for the medical care of
terminally ill patients and the relief of their pain and suffering. The right-to-end-life
issue before the Court in Glucksberg identified the importance of palliative care for
the terminally ill patient.85 A report by the Institute of Medicine at the National
Academy of Science identified the under-treatment of pain and the use of ineffectual
and intrusive medical procedures that may prolong suffering are major problems in
end of life care.86 Terminally ill patients are concerned about loss of personal
78

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 750.

79

Id. at 790.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 791.

82

Id.

83

521 U.S. at 735.

84

Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Facing the Final Exit: The U.S. Supreme Court Has Left The
Issue of Physician Assisted Suicide Up To The States, 83 A.B.A. J. 48, 51 (1997).
85
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that patients living in
a state where there were no legal barriers to obtaining medication to alleviate suffering will
have no liberty protection of due process). The question remains that if a state allows barriers
to exist or encourages them to develop, will there be a constitutional due process protection?
86

Lowe, supra note 84, at 51.
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autonomy, loss of control of bodily functions, and the control of severe pain.87 Pain
at the end of life is the most common reason people seek medical care.88 The
treatment of pain is often neglected in medical education and in care for the patient.
The assisted suicide issue has made end of life care the focal point in the decision
making process of how one dies.
Assisted suicide has been practiced by physicians without statutory authorization
or medical protection.89 In April 1998, the Massachusetts Medical Society published
the results of a 1996 national survey involving 3102 physicians in ten specialty firms
throughout the country.90 The survey reported that a substantial number of
physicians in the United States had received requests for assisted suicide, and that
about six percent complied with the request at least one time.91 The study
demonstrated that region of practice, religion, and specialty influenced a physician’s
participation in assisted death.92 The report suggested that the open debate in the
states of California, Oregon, and Washington may account for the higher frequency
of assisted suicide requests and physician compliance with such requests in these
states.93
The study found that a majority of the patients who requested assisted suicide
would have met regulatory safeguards similar to a those in Oregon’s statute
authorizing assisted suicide.94 The study discovered that in a majority of the cases.
hospitalized patients who received a lethal injection had less than twenty-four hours
to live and were experiencing severe discomfort or pain.95 The study suggested that
by delaying treatment of the patients’ pain symptoms, the physician could protect
against an accusation that he or she was intending to hasten death.96 The report
87

Arthur E. Chin, Physician Assisted Suicide In Oregon–The First Year’s Experience,
NEW ENG. J. MED., Feb. 18, 1999, at 577.
88

Id. at 579.

89

Diane E. Meier, A National Survey of Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
United States, NEW ENG. J. MED., Apr. 23, 1998, at 1192.
90

Id. at 1193.

91

Id. (The study reported that eleven percent of the physicians indicated they would be
willing under current law to assist a suicide while thirty-six percent would if it were legal.
The study also reported that seven percent responded that they would provide a lethal injection
while twenty-four percent reported they would if it were legal. Seventy percent of the
prescribed lethal medications were opioids and twenty-five percent were barbiturates.).
92

Id.

93

Id. at 1199.

94

Meier, supra note 89, at 1192. See also Charles H. Baron, A Model State Act to
Authorize and Regulate Physician Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, (1996) (stating it
is consistent with the fundamental values underlying the legal and ethical requirements of
respect for the right of competent patients to give or withhold consent to any treatment,
including life-sustaining treatment, and providing an overview of a model act allowing a
responsible physician to practice assisted suicide and placing a series of responsibilities on
that physician).
95

Meier, supra note 89, at 1200.

96

Id.
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recommended additional research to evaluate the possibility that better access to
palliative care might eliminate some of the requests for physician assisted suicides.97
The survey also noted that the demand for assisted suicide, and a corresponding
compliance by a doctor, might differ in communities where palliative care is easily
accessible, suggesting fewer requests where palliative care is readily available.98 In
Glucksberg, the Supreme Court also vocalized recognition of these circumstances,
while suggesting that the legislature was the appropriate body to address the
palliative care issue.99
The use of lethal injection seemed to be the method of choice by physicians for
patients having less that twenty-four hours to live and were experiencing severe
discomfort and pain.100 The report suggested that additional research was necessary
because the study was conducted when palliative care education was not available
and the provision of end-of-life care was inconsistent throughout the country.101 The
attitudes and choices of patients and physicians might change when palliative care
becomes readily available and the needs of the patient become a larger factor in the
medical treatment plan. The report also stated that current proposals for assisted
suicide guidelines would bear little relation to the clinical circumstances involving
physician care for the terminally ill patients.102 Current data indicates that physicians
are inadequately trained to assess and manage the complex symptoms of pain, that
are commonly related to a patient’s request for suicide.103 The appropriate and
aggressive use of pain-relieving drugs is recommended even if the use of the drug
hastens death.104 There have been improvements in the sensitivity of the medical
community in relating to the needs and desires of the dying patient.105 Physicians
have a responsibility to undertake timely and adequate discussions with patients for
agreement, not only about life-sustaining treatment, but also on how they want to be
cared for in the terminal stages of life.106 The involvement of the physician in endof-life care planning is deficient in part because inadequate training provided to
medical students.107 Consequently, practitioners may not sufficiently understand or

97

Id. at 1199.

98

Id.

99

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736.

100

See Meier, supra note 89, at 1193.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Kathleen M. Foley, Competent Care for the Dying Instead of Physician-Assisted
Suicide, NEW ENG. J. MED., Jan. 2, 1997, at 55.
104

Sidney H. Wanzer, The Physician’s Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A
Second Look, NEW ENG. J. MED., Mar. 30, 1989, at 844.
105

Id. at 845.

106

Id. at 846.

107

Id.
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value the role of the terminally ill patient in making decisions about terminal care
issues.108
According to American Medical Association reports, only five of the 126
medical schools in the United States require a course that specifically concentrates
on palliative care.109 Patients do not have confidence that the health care system will
take care of the needs of a terminally ill patient; particularly with regard to the care
necessary to deal with pain.110 Some health care providers have expressed that “there
is no doubt that the debate and high degree of tolerance shown for assisted suicide
has been a wake up call to the medical system.”111
While there is considerable support for the contention that the field of medicine
has had a long track record of under treating the pain of terminally ill patients, the
health care community is beginning to respond to the public debate on assisted
suicide.112 Pain control is now part of many specialty areas of medicine, and experts
report that ninety-five percent of patients with intractable pain can experience relief
without intolerable sedation.113 Patients with severe and intractable pain do not have
to end their life, and palliative care opportunities offer the most crucial element in
caring to the needs of the terminally ill patient.114 Under current guidelines for
assisted suicide, the terminally ill patient is the only individual who is permitted the
choice of ending his or her life.115
The care of the dying patient is an art that not only prepares the patient to cope
with the technology of the medical environment; it is an art of deliberately
developing the circumstances that allow the patient to experience a peaceful death.116
The physician must balance the inadequate treatment of the dying patient with the
intolerable use of aggressive life-sustaining procedures in order to achieve a level of
care that maximizes the comfort and dignity of the dying patient.117
The humanness of death is not only a matter of avoiding pain and physical
suffering, it is also about being consistent with the basic values of the patient.118
Patients fear and resent the experience of death which could be preceded by a period
of dependency or deterioration.119 Consequently, the World Health Organization has
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endorsed palliative care as an integral component of a national health care policy.120
The World Health Organization has also taken the position that its member countries
are not to consider the legalization of assisted suicide without having adequately
addressed the need for pain relief and palliative care.121 There is considerable
evidence which suggests that a request for assistance in suicide may mask an
underlying need for pain relief.122
The goal of palliative care is to relieve suffering and place the utmost importance
on the quality of the patient’s life.123 Palliative medicine focuses on improving the
control of pain, and management of the symptoms of the disease, while at the same
time addressing the psychological needs of patients and families facing a lifelimiting illness.124 Palliative medicine attempts to influence how a patient dies.125
The terminally ill patient must be prescribed whatever is medically necessary to
control pain.126
According to the Massachusetts Medical Society, narcotics or other pain
medications should be given in whatever dose and by whatever route is necessary for
relief.127 It further advocates that it is morally appropriate to increase the dosage to
levels needed even to the point where death is hastened, provided that the primary
objective of the necessary treatment plan is to relieve pain.128 This result is
commonly referred to as the double effect.129 The double effect occurs when a
terminally ill patient, in consultation with a physician, chooses to receive major
doses of pain-killing drugs under palliative care with knowledge that the treatment
may, as a secondary effect, result in death.130 Physicians have continuously argued
that there is a critical difference between the intent of a course of care that results in
death secondary to the intent of the treatment of pain even when the death is
foreseeable and the primary intent to assist in a suicide and the intent of
administering a lethal injection purely because it is lethal.131 The American Medical
Association Code of Ethics supports the role of the physician using an aggressive
treatment plan for pain in a palliative care circumstance even when the foreseeable
result could produce death.132
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The practice of palliative health care is beginning to evolve; a recent survey by
the Association of American Medical Colleges reported that 122 of 125 accredited
medical schools offered end of life studies as part of required medical courses.133
Fifty of those schools offered separate elective courses focusing on caring for the
dying patient.134 Health care professionals see that making physicians and nurses
aware of end of life issues is just the first step.135 The second step is to increase
awareness and opportunities in the hospital care setting.136
In the article Life and Death Choices, the author writes about a fifty-two year old
woman receiving palliative care, and who is dying from cancer of her brain and
neck.137 The patient was described as a terminally ill patient who had undergone
multiple surgeries resulting in the removal of part of her jaw and larynx.138 The
patient had received state of the art radiation therapy, but the progress the disease
had made would eventually end her life.139 The patient chose palliative medicine to
help her cope with the progression of her illness.140 She wore a transdermal patch
which releases an opioid drug into her system over the period of a few days.141 She
must also take an anti-convulsant drug twice a day to help her control nerve pain.142
The patient was described as requiring a moderately high dose of morphine to
effectively manage her pain.143 The patient stated that her pain management care
plan was working and allowed her to continue the enjoyment of life.144
The availability of palliative care provides for the relief of severe pain and
symptom management for the terminally ill patient. The terminally ill patient
considers assisted suicide only as a viable alternative to suffering severe pain during
the final stages of life. The use of assisted suicide as a means of end of life care will
be effectively reduced by improvements in palliative care options. The political
debate on assisted suicide must focus on the needs of the terminally ill patient and
the choices he or she must make to die with dignity and individual autonomy.
Viewed from this perspective, the legal and medical community can address the
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palliative care needs, thereby the assisted suicide choice becomes a less desirable
option in the care for terminally ill patients. Assisted suicide is a choice about self
determination, and terminally ill patients deserve the chance to make an individual
decision about how and when to die.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN OREGON
In Glucksberg, Justice O’Connor wrote that the states’ consideration of the
assisted suicide issue held the challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for
safeguarding liberty interests that were entrusted to the “laboratory of the States.”145
The Court in Glucksberg noted that forty-four states, the District of Columbia and
two territories prohibited, or were against, assisted suicide.146 The right to end life is,
for now, an issue which has been left for the states to address.147 Currently there is
only one state, Oregon, that has enacted a statute permitting an individual to
voluntarily end his or her life.148 Hawaii is currently considering a statute similar to
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.149 California’s legislature considered legislation
permitting assisted suicide; however, the bill never reached the floor for a vote and
died in committee on February 3, 2000.150
Oregon’s attempt to address the right to end life issue may represent the answer
to the questions raised in Glucksberg. The Court was not able to distinguish which
set of facts were persuasive enough to determine which side of the assisted suicide
argument was correct. The Oregon experiment is the only source of factual data
available in the United States and it is therefore essential to carefully examine the
impact on state legislation permitting physician assisted suicide.151
The Oregon assisted suicide initiative, the Death with Dignity Act, established a
statutory framework in which a competent terminally ill patient could legally receive
a prescription of medication for the purpose of ending their life.152 The voters passed
the ballot issue in November 1994 by a slim margin of fifty-one percent to forty-nine
percent. On November 23, 1994, fifteen days before the law was to take effect, a
suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon delaying
the implementation of the Death with Dignity Act.153 In Lee v. Oregon, the court
issued a permanent injunction to prevent the law from taking effect, finding that the
Act failed to provide sufficient safeguards to prevent an incompetent terminally ill
adult from committing suicide.154 The court, therefore, concluded that the Act
145

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737.

146

Id. at 710.

147

Id.

148

Pratt, supra note 42, at 188.

149

Id. at 187.

150

Rena Patel, Physician Assisted Suicide: Is It About Time, 35 CAL. W.L. REV. 333, 348
(1999).
151

Pratt, supra note 42, at 185.

152

Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997).

153

Id.

154

Id.

286

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 15:271

violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.155 On February 27, 1997,
the Ninth Circuit Court of the Appeals ruled that the distsrict court lacked
jurisdiction and vacated the injunction imposed by the lower district court.156 On
October 27, 1997, the injunction was lifted and physician assisted suicide became a
legal alternative for the terminally ill in Oregon.157
Glucksberg did not limit the ability of a state to enact provisions for individuals
to end his or her life by assisted suicide.158 The Court concluded that the state was
the proper place to decide the end of life liberty issue, and the political process was
responsible to determine the appropriate safeguards.159 The legal arguments
presented in Lee led the Oregon legislature to once again bring the assisted suicide
issue before the voters.160 Subsequently, there was serious concern that the Oregon
electorate may have changed position after the public and legal debate.161
Responding to this political possibility, the Oregon Judiciary Committee sponsored a
legislative bill calling for the repeal of the Death with Dignity Act.162 The Oregon
Legislative Assembly responded by passing the legislation that brought the repeal of
assisted suicide issue to the voters in a special election held on November 4, 1997.163
Oregon voters supported the Act by a wider margin than the previous election, sixty
percent voting to retain the law against forty percent voting to repeal it.164
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act is the only such legislation in the United
States.165 Several circumstances in Oregon may have played a role in the
development of this one-of-a-kind law. In 1996, Oregon’s per capita distribution of
morphine, the drug of choice for use in palliative care, was fifty percent higher than
the United States average.166 This may have been the result of a greater commitment
by Oregon working with the medical community to provide better care to the
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terminally ill patient.167 Oregon law provided protection for physicians prescribing
controlled substances for the treatment of patients suffering from intractable pain.168
A 1996 survey of 321 Oregon psychiatrists reported that sixty-six percent supported
permitting a physician to write a prescription for life ending medication under certain
circumstances.169 The survey also found that fifty-six percent of the psychiatrists
were in favor of the Act and seventy-four percent indicated that if they were
victimized by a terminal illness, they might consider the option of physician assisted
suicide.170 The report suggested that the medical community within Oregon was
more supportive of voluntary life termination than in other parts of the country.171
This possibility may be a result of the progressive nature of care for the terminally ill
in the state.172 Something different happened in Oregon because it continues to be
the only state offering assisted suicide.173 Other states may be watching the results of
Oregon’s experiment, seeing if it fails to adequately address the necessary safeguards
to protect individuals from undue influence and liberal utilization of assisted suicide.
Before the implementation of the Death with Dignity Act, a survey on physician
assisted suicide was conducted by the Massachusetts Medical Society in 1995.174
The survey rate of response was seventy percent.175 The survey reported that sixty
percent of the responding physicians thought physician assisted suicide should be
legal in some instances and found that forty-six percent of the physicians might be
willing to prescribe a lethal dose of medication if it were legal to do so.176 The
survey reported that twenty-one percent of the respondents had received requests for
assisted-suicide and seven percent had indicated that they had complied with the
request without a law protecting them.177 The results indicated that Oregon
physicians expressed a higher acceptance of physician assisted suicide than other
surveyed physicians.178 Seventy-three percent of the responding physicians reported
that they would refer a patient who requested physician assisted suicide or would
investigate the possibility of complying with the patient’s request.179 The survey
found no published information on the effectiveness of drugs and the proper dosage
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needed to effectively terminate a patients life.180 In Oregon, the only source of
information found was through the Hemlock Society.181
The Death with Dignity Act makes it legal for a physician to prescribe lethal
medication to terminally ill Oregon residents only for self-administration.182 The
statute continues to provide criminal penalties for individuals who assist others in
committing suicide.183 The Act legalizes physician assisted suicide while specifically
prohibiting euthanasia.184 The adult must be at least eighteen years of age and able to
make and communicate health cares decisions, make a voluntary expression of a
wish to die, and make a written request for medication for the purpose of ending
their life in a humane and dignified manner.185 To receive a prescription for lethal
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____________________________________________________________
REQUEST FOR MEDICATION
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I, _____________________, am an adult of sound mind.
I am suffering from _________, which my attending physician
has determined is a terminal disease and which has been
medically confirmed by a consulting physician.
I have been fully informed of my diagnosis, prognosis, the
nature of medication to be prescribed and potential associated
risks, the expected result, and the feasible alternatives,
including comfort care, hospice care and pain control.
I request that my attending physician prescribe medication
that will end my life in a humane and dignified manner.
INITIAL ONE:
______ I have informed my family of my decision and taken
their opinions into consideration.
______ I have decided not to inform my family of my decision.
______ I have no family to inform of my decision.
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medication, the patient must make two verbal requests to their physician that are
separated by at least fifteen days.186 As a final safeguard, the Oregon statute
provides that no less than fifteen days shall elapse between the patients initial request
and the writing of the prescription.187 There is an additional requirement that no less
than forty-eight hours shall elapse between the patient’s written request and the
issuance of the prescription.188
In order to monitor compliance with the Death with Dignity Act, the Oregon
Health Division has incorporated reporting requirements and procedures into
administrative rules.189 When a physician prescribes the medication to a patient, the
I understand that I have the right to rescind this request
at any time.
I understand the full import of this request and I expect
to die when I take the medication to be prescribed.
I make this request voluntarily and without reservation,
and I accept full moral responsibility for my actions.
Signed: ______________

Dated : ______________

DECLARATION OF WITNESSES
We declare that the person signing this request:
(a) Is personally known to us or has provided proof of
identity;
(b) Signed this request in our presence;
(c) Appears to be of sound mind and not under duress,

fraud or undue influence;
(d) Is not a patient for whom either of us is attending
physician.
_____________ Witness 1/Date ______________
_____________ Witness 2/Date ______________
NOTE: One witness shall not be a relative (by blood,
marriage or adoption) of the person signing this request,
shall not be entitled to any portion of the person's
estate upon death and shall not own, operate or be
employed at a health care facility where the person is a
patient or resident. If the patient is an inpatient at a
health care facility, one of the witnesses shall be an
individual designated by the facility.
186
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may not require it. The physician must report all prescriptions written to the Oregon Heath
Department.).
187

§ 127.850, § 3.08.

188

Id.

189

CENTER FOR DISEASE PREVENTION, supra note 157.

290

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 15:271

doctor must either submit the required forms to the Health Division or make relevant
parts of the medical record available to health officials.190 After a patient’s death, the
death certificate is reviewed against data provided by the required report forms.191
The Health Division has also developed an interview format for physicians
participating under the Act.192 The questions were developed in cooperation with the
Oregon Task Force to Improve the Care of Terminally Ill Oregonians.193
On February 18, 1999, the Oregon Department of Human Resources, Center for
Disease Prevention and Epidemiology issued a report: Oregon’s Death with Dignity
Act: The First Year’s Experience.194 The report covered information on all reported
patients who received a prescription for lethal medication and died during calendar
year 1998.195 During 1998, twenty-three individuals received prescriptions for lethal
medications under the Death with Dignity Act as reported by physicians to the
Oregon Center for Disease Prevention and Epidemiology.196 The following
summarizes some of the key findings provided by the report:
• (A) of the twenty-three reported deaths, fifteen died after taking the lethal
medication, six died from their underlying illness, and two were alive on
January 1, 2000;197
• (B) twenty of the patients had been residents of Oregon for longer than six
months when they received their prescriptions;198
• (C) eighteen of the deceased patients suffered from cancer;199
• (D) twenty of the patients were prescribed nine grams of secobarbital or
penobarbital combined with a number of non lethal prescriptions to be used in
conjunction with the lethal medication;200
• (E) the median time from taking the oral medication to unconsciousness was
five minutes and the median time to death was twenty-six minutes. No
complications such as vomiting or seizures were reported;201
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(F) none of the patients expressed concern to their physicians about the financial
impact of their illness;202
• (G) the patients prescribed the lethal medications were more likely than the
control group used to express concern about loss of autonomy or loss of control
of bodily functions;203
• (H) the study found no evidence to support the concern that voluntary suicide
would be used more by the poor, uneducated, or uninsured terminally ill
patient.204
One interesting observation identified in the study was the consistency of the
amount of drugs prescribed by the physicians.205 The report attributes this to the
availability of this information through advocacy groups such as the Hemlock
Society.206 The report also discovered that fourteen of the fifteen patients did not
express concern about pain control at the end of life, which may have been
attributable to the quality of palliative care available in Oregon.207 Oregon ranks
among the top five states in per capita use of morphine for medical purposes that
statistic is often used as a measure of the extent to which palliative care is
available.208 The report also found that the patients were concerned about controlling
the time of their death.209 The report stated: “many physicians reported that their
patients had been decisive and independent throughout their lives or that the decision
to request the lethal prescription was consistent with a long held belief about the
importance of controlling the manner in which they died.”210 The Oregon advocacy
group, Compassion In Dying, reported, according to its records, fifty-nine patients
had contacted the group since the Oregon law passed and indicated assisted suicide
was under consideration.211 The group reported that thirty-eight of those contacts
had died, eleven by assisted suicide, and five by receiving high doses of morphine
for pain as a result of the double practice.212
While many groups opposed to assisted suicide would prefer that the terminally
ill person in Oregon would not chose assisted suicide, most groups agree that the law
was implemented with care and thoughtfulness.213 One of the key elements under the
Oregon statue that makes assisted suicide more acceptable to the public is the patient
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must take the medication without help from a third party.214 This feature lessens the
possibility of undue influence or other influences upon a person’s choice to end their
life.215 Some acknowledge that the Oregon law gives residents of the state one more
option among many others at the end of life.216
Health care practitioners in the field of end of life care express that the law is
working well and there has been an overall improvement in the care of dying in
Oregon since the first initiative was voted into law in 1994.217 The reason Oregon
has been the experimental ground for assisted suicide may be found in the fact that
thirty percent of the deaths in the state had hospice support compared with nineteen
percent nationally.218 Only thirty percent of terminally ill patients die in hospitals,
which is a much lower rate than any other state.219 This would indicate greater
availability and acceptance of palliative care of patients in their natural home
environment.220 Many of the major hospitals in Oregon have been found to have
established strong pain management programs since Glucksberg.221 After enactment
of the Death with Dignity Act, referrals to hospice programs increased
significantly.222 Additionally, physicians increased the use of morphine and other
pain control medications which improve the end of life care and treatment of the
terminally ill patient.223
The successful implementation of a physician assisted suicide statute requires
well defined guidelines. The Oregon statute has existed for two years and early
indications are that the statute is meeting the needs of the terminally ill patient in
Oregon.224 The success of the Oregon statute can be traced to several factors. First,
the detailed guidelines provided by the statute reduces any serious doubts physicians
may have concerning the legality of prescribing lethal medication.225 Second, the
enactment of a statute eliminates the need for a physician to practice assisted suicide
in secret and will enable the physician to take part in public discussions, which will
enable public debate of the medical and legal issues.226 Third, terminally ill patients
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will no longer need to seek assisted suicide without adequate information about other
health care options.227 Fourth, terminally ill patients will not be as likely to chose to
end their life early for fear that the choice may not be available at a later time.228
Finally, the law allows for patients to die in the presence of loved ones instead of in
isolation.229
The Oregon Death with Dignity statute provides the terminally ill patient another
important health care option in the final stages of life. Physician assisted suicide
accounted for approximately five of every 10,000 deaths in Oregon in 1998, which
represented no abnormality in the state suicide rate.230 The choice of assisted dying
did not open a flood gate for people to start committing suicide. In fact the converse
is true, the individual selecting assisted dying in Oregon made the decision after
careful consideration of the choices while under the consultation of his or her
physician.231 The Oregon experience supports the contention that the terminally ill
patient requires a comprehensive choice of medical care options in order to
effectively manage the final stages of death. The Oregon law is also credited with
causing a significant increase in the terminally ill patient’s choice of hospice care
and providing a valuable model for other states to use in addressing the assisted
dying option. Assisted suicide is merely one choice available to the terminally ill
patient and will most likely be the preferred choice of medical care that helps the
227
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patient die with dignity and control. Assisted suicide is a medical option and not a
criminal act.
V. THE SOCIAL DEBATE ON ASSISTED SUICIDE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act and other similar legislative proposals are
not without legal challenges. End of life care issues came under intense scrutiny
while the Companion In Dying and Quill cases worked through the judicial
system.232 Advocates on both sides of the assisted suicide issue brought vast
amounts of information before the Glucksberg Court which ultimately impacted not
only the general public, but also influenced legislative leaders at the state and federal
levels. One national study on physician assisted suicide reported that regulatory
guidelines that are used by legislatures to draft end of life care and assisted suicide
statutes may have limited relationships to the actual clinical experiences under which
physicians care for the terminally ill patient.233 Federal legislation on palliative care
will have a significant impact on how well the medical needs of the terminally ill
patient are addressed by the medical community.
The first federal response to the assisted suicide issue involved attempts to
invalidate the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. On November, 11 1997, Thomas K.
Constantine, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency [hereinafter
“DEA”], authored a letter representing that the DEA would consider a prescription of
a drug under the Oregon Act as a violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act
because the prescription would not serve a legitimate medical purpose.234 As a
result, the Oregon Medical Society advised physicians to refrain from prescribing
lethal medications under the act.235 On June 5, 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno
issued a letter to U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee advising him that “adverse action against a physician who assisted in
suicide in full compliance with the Oregon Act would not be authorized by the
Controlled Substances Act.”236 Attorney General Reno justified her position based
upon the premise that the intent of the Controlled Substances Act was to keep legally
available controlled substances in legal channels of distribution for use while
preventing illegal trafficking.237 She stated that there was no congressional intent to
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supersede state authority to regulate the medical profession or override a state
determination of a legitimate medical practice.238
On the same day the Attorney General issued her letter, Henry Hyde introduced
the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998 to the House of Representatives.239
The purpose of the Act was to prohibit the dispensing or distributing of a controlled
substance for the purpose of causing, or assisting in causing, the suicide of any
individual.240 The proposed legislation exempted from prohibition the use of
controlled substance for the purpose of pain management even if its use increased the
risk of death.241
The Act placed the burden of proof on the prosecutor, using a clear and
convincing evidence standard, to establish that the practitioner’s intent was to cause
a death or assist in causing a death.242 The legislation was the first attempt at the
federal level to negate the Oregon assisted suicide statute.243
Hearings on the bill were conducted by the Judiciary Committee in July 1998. 244
In August, the Committee issued its report on the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act
of 1998 and recommended passage of the Act.245 The report indicated that the bill
would affirm, for the first time, within the Controlled Substances Act, the use of
controlled substances for pain management as a legitimate medical purpose,
exempting practitioners from penalties under the law.246 The committee reported that
the bill would make a clear distinction between the medical practice of pain
management which increased the risk of death and the practice of assisted suicide.247
The committee report stated that the need for legislation was due to the use of
controlled substances in Oregon under the Death with Dignity Act and the ruling by
Attorney General Reno to exclude the Oregon law from the jurisdiction of the
DEA.248 The report went on to emphasize three critical reasons for the proposed
legislation.249 First, the bill would reaffirm the legal prohibition and ethical rejection
of the intentional causing of another individual’s death.250 Second, the legislation
would apply “social brakes” to a destructive trend toward assisted suicide.251 And
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finally, the Act continued to provide the essential supports for the appropriate use of
controlled substances for pain management.252 The Judiciary Committee report
openly identified, as did the language of the bill, that the bill was designed to reverse
the decision of the voters of Oregon to pass the assisted suicide law.253 This
legislation raised important concerns about the right of the state to control the
practice of medicine that could be superseded by federal laws controlling the use of
drugs.254 The Act never reached the House floor for a vote and died in committee.255
In June 1999, Hyde introduced the Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 to the
106th Congress.256 The Act would provide for the alleviation of pain or discomfort
by amending the Controlled Substance Abuse Act and by making the dispensing of
medications for treatment a legitimate medical purpose even if use increased the risk
of death.257 The bill would clarify that nothing in the Controlled Substance Abuse
Act authorized the use of controlled substances for the purposes of assisted
suicide.258 The legislation outlined that the Controlled Substance Abuse Act did not
authorize intentional dispensing, distribution, or administration of a controlled
substance for the purpose of causing the death or assisting another person in dying.259
The Act would invalidate state laws that permit assisted suicide, such as in the
State of Oregon, by requiring that the Attorney General give no force and effect to
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v. Glucksberg. Congress has taken up the cause to prohibit assisted suicide at same time the
Supreme Court expressed support for state experimentation. The issue of overriding the
voters’ choice in Oregon was raised by eight members of the judicial committee in their
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support for the legislation: First, the bill would subject physicians and pharmacists to criminal
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state law authorizing or permitting assisted-suicide or euthanasia.260 The Act
effectively overrides Attorney General Reno’s decision of June 5, 1998 to not
interfere with the Oregon voters’ passage of the Death with Dignity Act.261 On
October 27, 1999, the bill passed in the House of Representatives, by a vote of 271156, and was introduced in the Senate on November 19, 1999, and referred to the
Judiciary Committee.262
The Act would make the dispensing of a controlled substance for the purpose of
intentional ending life a violation of federal law, regardless of whether or not it
violated state law.263 Physician survey results suggest that many physicians currently
prescribe controlled substances for causing death in the course of treatment of the
terminally ill patient.264 The Act would provide medical practitioners protection only
when controlled substances are used for appropriate pain relief.265 The Act provides
several programs and grants intending to develop and advance scientific
understanding of palliative care.266
The proposed legislation would end the Oregon experience with assisted
suicide.267 The Act would also have a serious impact on palliative care because the
line between acceptable palliative care and illegal assistance with suicide would rest
solely upon the intent of the physician.268 A subjective basis for interpretation could
make the application of the law very difficult with regard to physician treatment
decisions at the end of life and could threaten the ability of doctors to improve the
quality of palliative care by discouraging aggressive and appropriate treatment of
260
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the Act, the goal of such care is to alleviate pain and other distressing symptoms of the
disease, provide for enhancement of the quality of life for the patient while not hastening
death. The Pain Promotion Relief Act directs the establishment of a program to develop and
advance scientific understanding of palliative care with the collection and advance scientific
understanding of palliative care. The bill also authorizes the collection and dissemination of
palliative care protocols to public and private health care programs. The Act further
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to award grants for the development
and implementation of programs to provide education and training to professionals in
palliative care. The legislation effectively packages needed palliative care legislation for use
of controlled substances in pain management with a provision which will kill the Oregon
experiment in assisted suicide.).
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pain.269 The drug of choice under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act has been
Secobarbital and Phenobarbital which are classified as Schedule IV drugs under the
Controlled Substances Act.270 Therefore, passage of the Pain Relief Promotion Act
of 1999 would in effect make the Oregon statute illegal under federal law.271
Physicians would be reluctant to change the type of drugs used in assisted suicide
because there is no source available to provide information on reliable alternatives.272
The Judiciary Committee report outlined the possibility of a constitutional state
rights issue caused by modifying the Controlled Substance Abuse Act.273 Members
of the Committee argued that the Act was a federal intrusion of the states’ right to
regulate medical care.274 The concern for many legislators was that the Act overrode
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act; thirteen members of the committee concluded
that the 1999 bill disregarded the Supreme Court’s ruling in Washington v.
Glucksberg, authorizing and encouraging the states to engage in meaningful debate
and experiment in the case of assisted-suicide.275 During testimony before the
Judiciary Committee, many commentators recommended consideration of other,
more appropriate Legislative proposals before Congress.276
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euthanasia. The Committee supported the invalidation of the Oregon assisted suicide statute.
The Committee on Commerce conducted no hearings and rejected an attempt to insert the
provisions of another palliative care bill, the Conquering Pain Act of 1999 in place of the Pain
Promotion Relief Act.
The bill had not gone through the appropriate committee process. Members of the
Committee expressed concern about the lack of hearings on the important issues of assisted
suicide and palliative care. These Committee members justified recommending passage
without hearing because of the considerable number of medically related organizations
opposed to the legislation. The Committee qualified the recommendation stating that this
contentious area of public policy demands careful subcommittee consideration and expert
testimony by educated witnesses. The report also expressed concern about second guessing by
the Drug Enforcement Administration over the “intent and purpose” of physician care for a
terminally ill patient. The committee identified, as others had suggested, that the conduction
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In May 1999, Senator Ron Wyden introduced the Conquering Pain Act of 1999
to the U.S. Senate.277 This legislative proposal has no reference to the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act and takes no federal action to override that law.278 The legislative
approach in this bill is to singularly address the palliative care issue without any
attempt to amend the Controlled Substances Act.279 The Act amends the Public
Health Service Act in order to establish a method of dealing with the public health
crisis of pain.280 Pain has been identified as a major public health problem in the
United States estimated fifty million Americans are partially or totally disabled by
chronic pain.281 The Act requires the development of an internet web site for the
purpose of providing evidence-based practice guidelines for pain management.282
The proposal also requires the Medicaid and Medicare programs to inform
individuals what to expect under pain management care.283 The Act directs the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine how to include measurements
of pain and symptom management in the Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal
medical programs.284
Other provisions of the Act authorize funding to implement special education
projects by peer review organizations to improve pain and symptom management
care.285 The Act mandates grants to health care provider training facilities for the
establishment of six national family support networks in pain and symptom
management. Most importantly, the proposed legislation authorizes a study and
report to the Senate on ways federal insurance programs may provide palliative care
services.286 The bill mandates grants to establish at least five demonstration projects
on effective methods to measure improvement in the skills and knowledge of health
care pain and systems management.287 In October 1999, the Senate Committee on

of a Drug Enforcement Administration investigation would scare physicians from providing
quality palliative care. The committee members concluded that a more comprehensive
consideration was necessary in order to provide a better opportunity to resolve the difference
in view points with regard to palliative care. The committee stated that by careful
consideration of the issues, the result would be better palliative care legislation. In the same
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recommending the passage of the Pain Relief Promotion Act for many of the same reasons
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Health Education, Labor, and Pensions held hearings but, there had been no other
reported activity by the Senate.288
In March 1999, Senator John D. Rockefeller introduced the Advance Planning
and Compassionate Care Act of 1999 to the U.S. Senate.289 The Compassionate Care
Act would amend the Social Security Act by requiring the development of outcome
standards and measures to evaluate programs that provide end of life care.290 The
Act also requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to report evaluation
findings, including an annual Medicare report on the quality of end of life care, to
Congress.291 The Act would establish a central clearinghouse and a twenty-four
hour-toll free telephone hotline to provide information to individuals making end of
life medical care decisions.292 The Act also requires that the Medicaid program
provide coverage of self-administered prescription drugs for relief of pain to
terminally ill patients.293
VI. CONCLUSION
The State of Oregon may ultimately make a constitutional challenge in the event
the Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 becomes law. The challenge may be based
on the premise that the Act impinges on traditional state powers to regulate medicine
and physicians. The political debate has had a positive impact on health care for the
terminally ill patient. One of the legislative proposals for palliative care will
eventually pass and Congress, with a presidential approval, become law. Each
proposal before Congress underscores the pain management crisis in the United
States. Palliative care legislation as a recognized end of life option is finally coming
of age.
Many federal legislators, however, interpret assisted suicide as a direct assault
upon the ability of Congress to efficiently control drug usage. Noting this, the Pain
Relief Promotion Act of 1999 has simply rearranged the priorities first outlined in
the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998. The 1999 version is aimed at
invalidating the Oregon assisted suicide statute. Some members of Congress have
the intent of insuring that the assisted suicide experiment never takes place in any
other state, while eliminating the current law in Oregon. States’ rights proponents
are concerned that any federal legislation against assisted suicide would represent
misuse of Congressional authority to regulate drugs.294 The Controlled Substances
Abuse Act was designed to control drug abuse, not to define the medical uses of
drugs. This is not the direction suggested by Justice O’Connor when she offered the
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premise that the question should be addressed in the “laboratory of the states.”295
Assisted suicide is a means for states to provide individuals greater choice in end of
life care. These decisions should be left up to each state to decide, free from
Congressional influence and obstruction. On February 29, 2000, the State of Oregon
released a second year report required under the Death with Dignity Act.296 This
may provide advocates on both sides of the assisted suicide issue more information
so that better end of life decisions can be made for the terminally ill patient. Assisted
suicide is an end of life care choice that many patients need so they may die with
dignity and self-determination.
PHILIP KING

295

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737.

296

CENTER FOR DISEASE PREVENTION, supra note 157.

